50890 — SOLiD, Inc.

SOLiD, Inc. (KOSDAQ: 050890) — deep-value analysis

Analysis date: 28.08.2026 · Reference price used in the models: KRW … (the price at which the Monte Carlo simulation ran at 06:36) · Close 28.08.2026: KRW 8,980 (yfinance 050890.KQ, verified) · Market cap: KRW 540.7 bn (Naver Finance, 5,407 억원) / 543.5 bn at the reference price · Shares: 60,756,534 issued, 833,389 in treasury, 59,923,145 outstanding · Reporting and pricing currency: KRW (identical — no conversion) · Exchange: KOSDAQ (rank 155 by market cap)

Identification note. 050890 is a Korean numeric code, not an American ticker. The correct Yahoo symbol is 050890.KQ (KOSDAQ); 050890.KS returns a nameless residual quote at KRW 4,920 — a different entity. SOLiD is not SEC-registered (no CIK, no XBRL companyfacts), so EDGAR was intentionally skipped, per procedure. The primary source for the figures is the consolidated K-IFRS dataset (yfinance 050890.KQ, annual statements 2022-2025 and quarterly through Q1 2026), supplemented for Q2 2026 from stockanalysis.com and cross-checked against Naver Finance, valueline.co.kr and company announcements. Every figure in this report was re-verified directly at the source during this session — see the verification note at the end of the valuation chapter for the list of corrections made versus the brief and the tracker.

Executive summary (1 page: thesis, estimated value, verdict)

The thesis, in one paragraph. SOLiD is a Korean manufacturer of equipment that carries mobile signal inside buildings (DAS — distributed antenna systems), founded in 1998, with a genuine top-3-worldwide position in its niche and nearly three decades of almost uninterrupted profitability. The core business works, and the proof isn’t rhetorical: the gross margin rose from 37.4% (2024) to 44.6% (2025) in a year when revenue fell 10.9%, and reached 47.3% in Q2 2026. The balance sheet is clean — KRW 126.3 bn of cash and short-term instruments against KRW 132.0 bn of total debt, i.e. a near-zero net position. On top of that sit KRW 106.8 bn of investment property and 30.0 bn of non-current financial assets that produce no operating income. The problem isn’t the business, it’s the price. The stock re-rated … over 12 months and hit KRW 18,850 on 07.05.2026, versus a 2022-2025 trading band of KRW 3,800-8,859. At KRW …, the market pays 1.45x book value and ~14x cleaned operating EBITDA, for a business whose revenue grew at a 1.8% CAGR between 2022 and 2025 and whose return on invested capital (5.9… depending on definition) is below its own cost of capital.

Estimated value. Triangulation across five models, all recalculated in this session with the intrinsic_value engine from dcf_buffett.py (not manual arithmetic), gives a wide, predominantly negative range: from … (pessimistic DCF, OE 17,000 mn, g1 2%, r 12.5%) to … (optimistic DCF, which assumes that 2024 — the best free-cash-flow year in company history — becomes the starting point of 12%/year growth). The median of the five models is …, and the Monte Carlo simulation over 20,000 scenarios, starting from my central assumptions, gives a median of … and a probability of undervaluation of 2.9%. The median intrinsic value from the simulation is KRW 4,897/share. Even the most lenient of the control checks — the Graham Number, which rewards the balance sheet and reported accounting profit — gives only …, i.e. zero margin of safety.

Verdict: AVOID at the current price. Not because the business is bad — it isn’t — but for three measurable reasons. (a) The price already embeds the optimistic American scenario that brokers have only just begun announcing: to hit Mirae Asset’s forecast of KRW 388.1 bn revenue in 2026, the second half must deliver 254.2 bn, i.e. … versus H2 2025, while extrapolating the company’s own seasonality gives ~352 bn. (b) Reported earnings quality has deteriorated severely: over the trailing 12 months SOLiD reported KRW 54.5 bn of net profit and collected 14.7 bn from operations — 73.1% of the profit is accounting accruals, not cash. (c) Net profit has completely decoupled from operations, in both directions, two quarters running: Q1 2026 had an operating loss of 2.13 bn and net profit of +22.27 bn (of which 7.77 bn was a non-cash gain from revaluing financial assets); Q2 2026 had operating profit of +3.54 bn and net profit of −0.14 bn, because that same financial portfolio this time produced a loss of KRW 6.72 bn. My re-entry threshold is the 6,100-… zone (EPV plus non-operating assets), i.e. a ~31% decline — a level last reached on 30.09.2025.

What would change the thesis, with numeric thresholds. Two concrete things: (1) revenue above KRW 95 bn in Q3 2026 (versus 70.0 bn in Q3 2025), which would validate the American trajectory forecast by Mirae Asset; below 85 bn, the scenario is dead. (2) A normalization of the conversion cycle: DSO under 75 days and DIO under 100 days for two consecutive quarters, which would demonstrate growth converting to cash rather than receivables and inventory. In Q2 2026 the two stood at 89.7 and 136.4 days — both deteriorating. Neither condition is visible in today’s figures.