DECK — Deckers Outdoor Corporation

DECK — Deckers Outdoor Corporation · deep-value analysis

Date: September 2, 2026 · Exchange: NYSE · Reporting and trading currency: USD Reference price: … (close of September 1, 2026; the tracker has …, the August 31 close) Market cap: … · Shares outstanding: 136,725,491 (06/30/2026, DEF 14A) Fiscal year: ends March 31. “FY2026” = the year ended 03/31/2026.

Primary sources: 10-K FY2026 (filed 05/22/2026), 10-Q Q1 FY2027 (filed 07/30/2026), the FY2026 10-Qs, the 8-K earnings releases from 05/21/2026 and 07/23/2026, DEF 14A from 07/24/2026, an 8-K from 08/31/2026 (credit facility amendment), plus the internal data pack from 09/01/2026 and yfinance for prices and market multiples. Every figure has its source next to it.

Executive summary

Deckers sells HOKA, UGG and Teva. In the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026 it made 5,472.3 mn USD of revenue (…), 1,262.9 mn of operating profit (23.1% margin), 1,024.1 mn of net profit and … mn of free cash flow. It has zero interest-bearing debt, has 1,602.6 mn cash at June 30, 2026, and has repurchased … mn of shares in FY2026 plus another 338.2 mn in the June quarter. The stock trades at …, i.e. …x the last four quarters’ profit, 10.1x FY2027 estimated profit, and 7.9x EV/EBIT after subtracting cash. Twenty months ago the stock was ….

The thesis is simple and uncomfortable: the market has re-rated Deckers from a growth company (30.1x profit at 03/31/2024) into a mature-value one (…x today), while profit per share grew from 4.88 to …. The 58% drop from the peak doesn’t come from a fall in results — it comes from the fact that the growth engine, HOKA, has slowed from … (FY2024) to … (FY2026) and to … in the June 2026 quarter, while the brand’s operating margin fell from 39.8% to 35.2% in two years. In other words: the market doesn’t doubt today’s profit, it doubts that it keeps growing.

This report’s central check was the free-cash-flow bridge, and here Deckers is a clean case: it reports under US GAAP, pays 2.5 mn of interest per year (on no borrowings, just fees), and all operating lease payments — … mn in FY2026 — flow through operating cash flow. There’s no finance lease, no minority interests, no dividends. CFO minus capex IS the flow to the shareholder, with a divergence under 1%. I still started from a figure lower than the reported … mn: 960 mn owner earnings, after removing net interest income (I value cash separately), normalizing capex to the company’s guided FY2027 level (145-155 mn versus … actual), and deducting 44.8 mn of stock compensation as a real economic cost. The owner-earnings yield at the current price is 8.3%; the reported free-cash-flow yield, 9.5%.

Triangulated valuation across five models gives a range from … (pessimistic DCF: 2% growth, 11.5% discount) to … (management’s published multi-year framework), with a median of …. The Greenwald-style zero-growth value is … — 7% BELOW the market price. This is the figure that matters most: at … the market is paying a premium of only 8% above the assumption that Deckers never grows again. The Monte Carlo simulation over 20,000 scenarios gives a median intrinsic value of …, a median margin of safety of … and an undervaluation probability of …% — but with the pessimistic end P10 at …, meaning one in ten plausible scenarios leaves you underwater even from here.

Verdict: INTERESTING, with a small initial position and evidence-conditional adding. Convergent with the tracker’s prior GBL score (66.7%, “INTERESTING,” evaluated 08/30/2026). Accounting quality is HIGH — operating flow exceeds net profit in each of the last three years, the cash conversion cycle has shortened from 84 to 37 days in three years, receivables grow slower than revenue. What I don’t like: the CEO profile is not Outsider-type (compensation tied to revenue and profit, not to capital allocated; 0.4% total insider ownership; a bonus at 173% of target in the year shareholders lost half their money), and growth’s incremental margin — 17.2% consolidated in FY2026 versus a 23.1% average margin — says every new dollar of sales comes more expensively than the old ones. This is the thesis’s real problem, not tariffs.