INTU — Intuit Inc.

Deep-value analysis: INTU — Intuit Inc.

Date: September 3, 2026 · Price: USD … · Market cap: USD 93.81 bn · Shares: 273.5 mn · Exchange: NASDAQ Fiscal year: ends July 31. FY2026 = Aug 1, 2025 – Jul 31, 2026, reported on August 25, 2026. Primary sources: 8-K/EX-99.01 from 08/25/2026 (full FY2026 results), 10-Q Q3 FY2026 (05/20/2026), 10-K FY2025 (09/03/2025), 10-K FY2023, DEF 14A (11/26/2025), 8-Ks 03/16/2026 / 04/28/2026 / 05/20/2026, XBRL companyfacts, data pack data-pack-INTU-20260903.md.

Data caveat, stated upfront: the FY2026 10-K was NOT filed with EDGAR as of the morning of September 3, 2026 (the last 10-K on file is the one from 09/03/2025). All FY2026 annual figures in this report come from the earnings release attached to the 8-K from 08/25/2026 — complete financial statements (P&L, balance sheet, cash flows), but unaudited and without notes. The line-item balance sheet detail stops at 04/30/2026 (10-Q Q3). Where something is missing, it is stated in the text; nothing has been estimated.

Executive summary

The thesis, in one sentence: Intuit is a software franchise with a 27% operating margin and a 23% return on invested capital, which grew revenue 17.4% annually for five years and which the market has re-rated from 48x earnings to 21x in eight months, without the company missing a single one of its own estimates — if the fear of AI disintermediation of DIY tax filing is overblown, today’s price buys compounding at a public-utility multiple; if it isn’t overblown, you are paying a fair price for an asset that is eroding.

What happened to the price. Median quote by fiscal quarter: FY26Q1 (Aug–Oct 2025) USD 676.5, FY26Q2 626.7, FY26Q3 (Feb–Apr 2026) 412.9, FY26Q4 (May–Jul 2026) 312.0, low 253.90. 52-week high: 705.08; low: 252.84 (yfinance, 09/03/2026). A ~51% collapse from the peak.

What happened to the business, over the same period. FY2026 revenue: USD 21.448 bn, … (guidance reiterated in February 2026: 20.997–21.186 bn — beaten). GAAP operating income USD 5.884 bn, … (guidance 5.782–5.859 — beaten, including after a USD 293 mn restructuring charge not included in guidance). Diluted GAAP EPS USD 16.46, … (guidance 15.49–15.69 — beaten by ~5%). There is no downward revision of estimates and no quarter below guidance in the SEC filings of the last four quarters. The re-rating is entirely multiple compression.

What management did with the low price. FY2026 buybacks: USD 5.412 bn cash (… vs. USD 2.772 bn in FY2025), distributed inversely to price — USD 854 mn in Q1 at an average quote of ~676, 933 mn in Q2 at ~627, 1.550 bn in Q3 at ~413, 2.075 bn in Q4 at ~312. On May 7, 2026 the board increased the authorization by another USD 8.0 bn. On March 16, 2026, via a Regulation FD 8-K, the founder (Scott Cook) and the entire executive team cancelled all scheduled 10b5-1 selling plans and the company publicly announced accelerating buybacks. I cannot recall a less ambiguous “insiders think this is too cheap” signal than this one.

The FCF bridge, briefly (detail in the valuation chapter). Reported operating cash flow for FY2026 is USD 8.838 bn, … vs. 6.207 bn. Of the increase, 1.279 bn is the reversal of the deferred tax asset generated by OBBBA (immediate expensing of domestic R&D, explicitly flagged in the FY2025 10-K) — a non-repeating cash windfall. And SBC of 2.056 bn (9.6% of revenue) is a real economic cost, covered by buybacks. Normalized owner earnings: USD 5.30 bn, i.e. USD 19.38/share and a 5.65% yield at the current price — not the 9.2% that “CFO minus capex” gives on a gross basis.

Estimated value. Five triangulated models: bear DCF FCFE USD 207.51 (…), no-growth Greenwald EPV USD 210.26 (…), historical multiples with a 50% haircut USD 401.63 (…), base-case DCF FCFE USD 415.65 (…), bull DCF FCFE USD 599.73 (…). Monte Carlo over 20,000 scenarios on top of the base model: median USD …, P10 …, P90 …, probability of undervaluation …%. Average target of the 31 analysts covering the stock: USD 411.70 (range 290–921) — practically identical to my median, which is more reassuring than suspicious: my model is not an eccentricity.

Verdict: GRADUAL ACCUMULATION, moderate position (3… of portfolio), staged entry. Not “buy it all”: the Monte Carlo range is 128 percentage points wide, and the width comes almost entirely from uncertainty in the owner-earnings base — that is, exactly the question I have not answered (how much of the 5.3 bn flow is durable if TurboTax erodes). A P(undervalued) of 69% with a left tail at … justifies a position that hurts, but not one that matters.

What could break it, briefly: (1) TurboTax units are already declining (… in FY2026, desktop …), and FY2027 guidance for TurboTax is +2… — growth entirely from price; (2) FY2027 operating margin guidance (…%, +440bp) depends on a 17% workforce reduction announced in May 2026, which has not yet shown up over a full year of results; (3) the credit portfolio (QuickBooks Capital + TurboTax refund advances) is growing fast, and the credit-loss expense rose from 134 to 237 mn in one year.