NPSNY — Naspers Limited

Naspers Limited (NPSNY) — deep-value analysis

Date: September 8, 2026 · Symbol: NPSNY (Level I ADR, OTC Pink) · Primary share: NPN.JO (Johannesburg) Price: …/ADS · Market cap: … · Fiscal year: April 1 – March 31 (FY2026 = year ended 03/31/2026) Conversion ratio: 1 N ordinary share = 5 ADS · Net N shares outstanding: 747.9 mil (08/28/2026) = 3,739.5 mil ADS

Primary sources used: Naspers — Summary from the integrated annual report 31 March 2026 (published 06/29/2026) and Annual financial statements for the year ended 31 March 2026 (audited, PwC); Prosus — FY2026 media release (06/29/2026), Interim results announcement six months ended 30 September 2025, the official Net asset value page (19-analyst consensus, updated 08/28/2026); Naspers — the official Net asset value page (10-analyst consensus) and Shares in issue. Prices and FX: yfinance, 09/08/2026.

Note on the SEC file: edgar_10k_downloader.py NPSNY returns “CIK not found — not a US-listed company.” Naspers does not file with the SEC: NPSNY is a Level I ADR on the OTC market, exempt from registration under Rule 12g3-2(b). For the same reason, deep_data_pack.py produced a thin pack (quarterly P&L and cash flow unavailable, three balance-sheet columns). All figures in this report come from the issuer’s JSE/AFM filings, not from yfinance, except prices and market series. This is a real limitation and I state it explicitly: there’s no 20-F to cross-check against.

Executive summary (1 page: thesis, estimated value, verdict)

Naspers isn’t an operating company in the usual sense; it’s a South African holding company that owns 43.05% of Prosus N.V. (904.1 mil of the 2,100.2 mil net Prosus shares outstanding), and Prosus owns 22.66% of Tencent plus an e-commerce asset portfolio. By construction, 76% of the net-asset value attributable to an NPSNY shareholder is a single stake: Tencent. The rest — iFood, OLX, Just Eat Takeaway, eMAG, PayU, Despegar, Takealot, plus a portfolio of listed stakes in India — is 24%.

The thesis is arithmetic, not narrative. At …/ADS, with Tencent at HKD 435.40, the market value of the look-through Tencent stake is …/ADS. You pay 73% of the market value of the Tencent shares you own indirectly and get the remaining …/ADS of assets free (unlisted 3.78, other listed 0.87, Takealot+Media24 0.32, minus look-through net debt 0.84). Put differently: Tencent trades at 13.9× 2025 non-IFRS profit (RMB 259.6bn); through NPSNY you buy it at 10.1×. Naspers’s consensus NAV, recalculated by me at today’s prices, is …/ADS — a discount of ** ….**

The second half of the thesis is the mechanism converting the discount into cash. Since June 2022 the group has systematically sold Tencent shares and bought back its own: cumulatively, Prosus has repurchased 939,992,619 N ordinary shares for …, and Naspers has sold 365,249,825 Prosus shares and bought back 323,404,606 of its own N shares, totaling …. Prosus’s free float has fallen 32%; the Naspers share count fell from 813.7 mil (03/31/2025, adjusted for the 5:1 split in October 2025) to 746.9 mil (08/28/2026), i.e. … in 17 months. Every dollar spent at a 44.5% discount buys … of NAV. That’s why, in FY2026, core headline earnings grew 14% while core headline earnings per share grew 24% — the 10-percentage-point difference is the buyback, pure.

Estimated value. Triangulating five models gives a wide range, which is honest for a holding company: from …/ADS (EPV Greenwald at 10%, i.e. with no growth at all) to …/ADS (gross NAV), with a median of …/ADS. The Monte Carlo simulation over 20,000 scenarios gives a median intrinsic value of …/ADS (MOS …), with an …% probability of undervaluation and a pessimistic P10 tail of ….

Verdict: BUY, with a position sized as Tencent exposure, not as a diversified position. The buy case has three mutually supporting legs: (1) a 44.5% discount to a NAV in which … of the asset is daily marked to a stock exchange, hence hard to contest; (2) a buyback machine running at ~…/year that grows NAV per share regardless of what the market does; (3) a price 36% below the September 2025 high (NPSNY …) because Tencent fell 34% from 655.4 to … — a multiple move, not an earnings move, since Tencent’s non-IFRS profit grew 17% over the same period.

The caution argument is just as concrete and I put it up front, not in a footnote: the operating ecosystem today contributes almost nothing to attributable profit. Of the … of FY2026 core headline earnings, the look-through Tencent share is 0.4305 × 8,117 = …, i.e. 98%. Everything else — … of consolidated revenue, … of ecosystem-level aEBIT — evaporates after corporate costs (235 mil), amortization, interest, and minority interests. You buy Tencent at a discount and get, for free, an ecosystem that still doesn’t produce profit for the top-level shareholder. And in FY2027 it will produce even less: management announced on May 12, 2026 that iFood aEBITDA falls to …-150 mil from 400 mil, in response to competitors that have committed to spend over … in Brazil. The stock fell 7% that day and hasn’t recovered.