TRMD — TORM PLC Class A

TRMD — TORM plc. Deep-value analysis, 09/02/2026

Ticker: TRMD (Nasdaq New York + Nasdaq Copenhagen) · Price: … (09/02/2026) · Market cap: 3,400 mn USD · Shares: 102.4 mn · Reporting currency: USD (same as price — no conversion risk)

Primary sources: 20-F FY2025 filed 02/26/2026 (CIK 0001655891), interim H1 2026 report filed as a 6-K on 08/26/2026, Q1 2026 report (6-K 05/14/2026), the 20-Fs for FY2021–FY2024, Schedule 13D/A from 06/23/2026, Form 4s from 05/20/2026 and 08/28/2026, data-pack-TRMD-20260902.md, XBRL companyfacts.

Executive summary

TORM is a product tanker owner (97 ships: 22 LR2, 10 LR1, 65 MR) that just reported the best quarter in company history: in Q2 2026 it made 512 mn USD of TCE revenue, 415.6 mn of EBITDA and 338.3 mn of net profit, at a fleet-wide average rate of …/day versus …/day in Q2 2025 (…). The cause is singular and dated: the US-Israel-Iran conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz from late February 2026, which broke refined-product flows out of the Persian Gulf and pushed two-thirds of the world’s LR2 fleet into crude transport (“dirty-ups”), cutting global clean-product transport capacity by ~5%. TORM raised its 2026 guidance by 200 mn USD, to TCE 1,400–1,600 mn and EBITDA 1,000–1,200 mn.

My thesis is that today’s price no longer leaves a margin of safety, precisely because the market is correctly reading the peak numbers. At … the stock trades at 5.5× TTM profit, 3.7× 2026E EBITDA and 0.91× the net asset value the company calculates on broker valuations (…/share at 06/30/2026). All three look cheap; all three are cycle-peak artifacts. The test that matters for a shipowner is: what does this fleet earn in a year with no war? The answer, calibrated on FY2025 — the last year without the Hormuz premium, with a TCE of …/day — is a flow to the shareholder of roughly 290 mn USD a year (normalized net profit 286 mn + amortization 214.5 mn − maintenance capex ~210 mn). Discounted at … with 2%/1% growth, this gives an intrinsic value of …/share, 12% below the price.

The figure the market is pricing in can be read the other way: at …, TORM is valued exactly on a normalized flow of 330 mn USD/year, i.e. on a mid-cycle average TCE of …/day. That’s above FY2025 (28,783) and 17% above the company’s ten-year average (…/day, 2017–2026E). It’s not absurd — the post-2022 regime really was structurally better (Russia sanctions, refinery closures in the Atlantic basin, longer ton-miles) — but it means the war premium is already in the price plus a bit more, not that it’s ignored.

Triangulated valuation (five models, detailed in the dedicated chapter) gives a range from … to …, with a median of …. Monte Carlo across 20,000 scenarios, started from the same assumptions, gives a median MOS of ** …** and a ** … probability the stock is undervalued**. The range is very wide (P10 …, P90 …) and its width is itself the message: with 34,431 sailing days a year, every …/day moves EBITDA by ~34 mn USD, i.e. 1% of market cap. There’s no “correct” central figure here, there’s a bet on rates.

Verdict: I do NOT buy at …. The company is good — a balance sheet with net LTV of 22.4%, 804 mn USD of liquidity, relaxed covenants (a minimum equity ratio of 25% versus an actual 66.7%), a competitively costed operator. But the asset is being bought at 0.91× NAV, at a moment when NAV itself has grown 42% in six months on broker valuations inflated by war rates, and the CEO sold all his directly held shares in May 2026 at 31.94–…. The price at which this becomes interesting is the 24–… zone (0.67–0.71× NAV — exactly the multiple it sat at in 2024 and mid-2025), or proof that the 33,000+ USD/day regime survives the reopening of Hormuz. Until then: WATCH, don’t buy.