KOSDAQ (KOSDAQ) · Healthcare
M.I.TECH Co., Ltd 179290
InterestingScore band: 60–70
The thesis, in one sentence
A Korean maker of non-vascular stents has a real certification moat and cheap operating multiples, but free cash flow disappeared into a working-capital shock this year, and the cash on the balance sheet is worth only a fraction of face value to a minority shareholder.
Written for this site in plain English, without figures. The arithmetic is in the full report.
Key risks
- Free cash flow vanished into a working-capital shock this year
- Cash held on the balance sheet is discounted heavily for minority access
- A receivables buildup could signal slowing collections from customers
What would change the verdict
- Days sales outstanding stay elevated for two consecutive quarters
- Gross margin falls for two consecutive quarters
- Operating margin falls for two consecutive quarters
- Debt relative to equity rises into levered territory
Read it yourself
Step five of the method is the reader's: open the latest annual or quarterly report and read it before acting on anything here. A score is a summary, and a summary is not understanding.
This exchange has no stable per-company address, so the link opens the disclosure portal — search there for the ticker.
The deep report was written against the filings available on 2026-09-14; anything published since is not in it.
Price, one year
DCF valuation range
range of the DCF modelsbase casetoday's price
Valuation range, shape only. Figures in the full version.
Monte Carlo outcome shape
scenarios below today's pricescenarios above today's pricetoday's price
Distribution of simulated outcomes around today's price. Bar heights only; the scale and the percentiles are in the full version.
Where the money goes
Last four reported quarters, 2025-06 → 2026-06, in KRW. Filings data as gathered on 2026-09-14. Figures rounded to three significant digits.
Chapter one: Executive summary
Deep-value analysis — M.I.TECH Co., Ltd (179290, KOSDAQ)
Date: 09/14/2026 · Price: … (tracker, 09/14/2026; the 16:07 data pack gives …)
Shares: 32,365,678 (note 11, H1 2026 semiannual report) · Market cap: …
Single currency: reporting in KRW, trading in KRW — no conversion, no ADR, no ADS/ordinary reconciliation
Reason for re-analysis: the deep_delta.py triage decided FULL — the fcf_yield < 0.03 falsifier broke
Primary sources used:
- DART/FSS, semiannual report 반기보고서 (2026.06), filed 08/14/2026, no. 20260814002272 — consolidated statements + notes 1-22
- DART/FSS, annual report 사업보고서 (2025.12), filed 03/18/2026, no. 20260318001578 — FY2025/FY2024/FY2023 statements, receivables aging, audit opinion
- DART/FSS
fnlttSinglAcntAll(structured XBRL) for FY2025 with comparative FY2024/FY2023 columns and for Q1 2026 - yfinance (via
deep_data_pack.py, 09/14/2026) for the quarterly series and market price - stockanalysis.com (flows and multiples, consulted 09/14/2026) — external check only
- research brief
research-179290-20260914.md(09/14/2026) — market context and consensus
Executive summary
M.I.TECH makes non-vascular stents (gastrointestinal, biliary) under the HANAROSTENT brand, 82.2% of revenue, plus distribution of Fujifilm endoscopes in Korea (8.9%) and accessories (8.9%). 185 employees generate … of annual revenue with a 29… operating margin and a ROIC on strictly operating capital of 35…. It's a real business, small, high-margin, with a technical position hard to replicate in six months. The stock trades at P/E 7.8, P/B 1.22 and — after subtracting net financial assets of … — at EV/EBIT of 3.76x on TTM operating profit of 20,660 mil. On paper, it's among the cheapest things in the universe.
The thesis from 08/23/2026 said exactly this and gave a BUY. In the meantime the semiannual report was published, and it breaks one of the thesis's six claims and cracks a second. Free flow disappeared: Q2 2026 CFO was negative (−1,238 mil) on net income of 5,828 mil; over the half, CFO was 827.5 mil versus 3,303.6 mil in H1 2025 (…). The cause isn't profit — operating profit was flat (10,715.7 vs 10,729.8, …) — it's working capital, which absorbed … in six months. Gross receivables rose from 12,659 to 20,301 mil (…) on revenue growing only 10.8%; DSO jumped from 62 to 98 days, and in Q2 alone 32.8% of the quarter's revenue remained uncollected. Inventory rose 26.1%. The cash conversion cycle lengthened from 166 to 200 days.
An important correction before any conclusion: the figure that triggered the triage is wrong. The data pack reports "CFO trailing 4Q 6.68 bn" and "simple FCF −1.00 bn · yield …." The yfinance four-quarter window doesn't contain Q4 2025 (the quarterly series has 2025-03, 2025-06, 2025-09, 2026-03, 2026-06, but not 2025-12), so it skips exactly the best quarter. Reconstructed from filings, CFO TTM at June 2026 is 12,398 mil — a figure independently confirmed by stockanalysis.com (12,398 mil). Simple FCF TTM is 5,301 mil (yield 3.28%), FCFE 3,821 mil (2.36%). The fcf_yield < 3% falsifier still triggers, but at the edge of the threshold, not at …. The deterioration is real; the magnitude in the triage is not.
The second problem is older and hasn't improved: 52% of the share price is cash and financial assets (…, …/share), and that money is managed as the controlling group's venture fund. 13,085 mil is deposited in partnerships managed by the controlling shareholder's GP — in two of them M.I.TECH puts up 52.58% and 97.84% of the capital, but classifies them as "associates" because the final decision belongs to the GP. On 07/27/2026 the board approved another 10,021 mil for 33.7% of a French software startup (PrediSurge). The shareholder return rate over the last four years (dividends + buybacks ÷ cumulative net income) is …%. This is where λ = 0.22 in the simulation comes from: the money exists, but historically the minority holder sees a fifth of it.
Estimated value: range 3,580–…, Monte Carlo median … (20,000 scenarios, λ = 0.22 on net cash). Median MOS ** …**, probability of undervaluation …, probability of a margin above 30% only …%. The five triangulated models range from … (bear DCF) to … (historical multiples).
Verdict: HOLD, small position (≤1% of portfolio), no adding at …. Downgrade from BUY on 08/23/2026. Not because the business broke — gross margin is actually better (58.4% vs 57.3%) — but because the two things the thesis depended on moved in the wrong direction simultaneously: free flow disappeared into working capital behaving like distributor financing, and the governance discount is confirmed active (PrediSurge, new fund contributions) instead of closing. At EV/EBIT 3.8x the business deserves to be held; at 55% probability of undervaluation it doesn't deserve to be added to.
Figures were removed from this excerpt. The full report opens free for five tickers a week — see what's open now.
Full report contents
- Executive summary
- 🔒 The business and the moat (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Management and capital allocation (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 What changed over the last 4 quarters (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Balance sheet analysis — Quality of Earnings (Thornton O'Glove method) (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 CEO profile — Outsider traits (William Thorndike method) (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Accounting red flags (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Triangulated valuation (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Pre-mortem (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Verdict compared to the GBL score in the tracker (Available in the full report)
Evaluation history
| Date | Verdict |
|---|---|
| 2026-08-23 | Buy candidate |
| 2026-09-06 | Buy candidate |
| 2026-09-14 | Interesting |
Want the rest of this report?
Subscribe to get one full deep report a week by email, the day before it opens on the site.