New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) · Energy
SandRidge Energy, Inc. SD
InterestingScore band: 60–70
The thesis, in one sentence
A small exploration and production company with no interest-bearing debt and a solid cash balance, where three independent valuation anchors converge within a few cents of the market price — fairly valued, not a dislocation.
Written for this site in plain English, without figures. The arithmetic is in the full report.
The thesis is from the deep report of 2026-09-04; the verdict badge reflects the latest scoring of 2026-09-06.
Key risks
- Half the volume is gas sold at a deep unexplained discount to the benchmark
- Management prefers discretionary dividends to buying back stock below value
- Reserve value depends on a re-pricing only verifiable in the annual filing
What would change the verdict
- Current liquidity deteriorates, removing the net cash safety net
- Free cash flow yield falls, undermining the owner-earnings base
- Operating margin falls if the gas discount proves permanent rather than cyclical
- The multiple re-rates upward without any rise in earning power
Read it yourself
Step five of the method is the reader's: open the latest annual or quarterly report and read it before acting on anything here. A score is a summary, and a summary is not understanding.
Next report expected 2026-11-04. The deep report was written against the filings available on 2026-09-04; anything published since is not in it.
Price, one year
DCF valuation range
range of the DCF modelsbase casetoday's price
Valuation range, shape only. Figures in the full version.
Monte Carlo outcome shape
scenarios below today's pricescenarios above today's pricetoday's price
Distribution of simulated outcomes around today's price. Bar heights only; the scale and the percentiles are in the full version.
Where the money goes
Last four reported quarters, 2025-09 → 2026-06, in USD. Filings data as gathered on 2026-09-04. Figures rounded to three significant digits.
Chapter one: Executive summary
SandRidge Energy, Inc. (SD) — Deep-value report (refresh)
Generated: 2026-09-04 · Price: … · Market cap: 530.5M USD (37.075M shares) · Sector: Energy / Oil & Gas E&P (independent, Mid-Continent) · Exchange: NYSE · Reporting currency = price currency: USD (no conversion)
Regime: REFRESH over the thesis from 2026-07-27 (verdict then: MONITOR, median MOS …). Mechanical trigger: 2 new filings (10-Q Q2 2026 filed 06.08.2026, 8-K earnings release 05.08.2026) and one unverifiable falsifier (net debt/EBITDA, lacking consecutive quarters).
What I inherit without re-derivation (nothing in the new filings touches it): the business and asset-base description (1,446 gross / 825 net wells, 574,599 gross acres, a single rig, average 57.1% working interest — 10-K FY2025 Item 1); proved reserves at 31.12.2025 (69.1 MMBoe, R/P 10.2 years, PV-10 439.6M USD certified by Cawley, Gillespie & Associates on 97.9% of volume); the "no structural moat" verdict; the Icahn activism history (Settlement Agreement 2018, board expansion July 2025, Plan Confidentiality Agreement of 22.07.2025); the M&A history (Upland/Cherokee 121.9M USD August 2024, bolt-on 5.2M USD December 2024); customer concentration (68% of FY2025 revenue from 3 customers).
What I fully re-derived (moved by the new filings): Q2 2026 results and the realized-price package; the FCF bridge and normalized owner earnings; all 5 valuation models; the Monte Carlo simulation; the PV-10 estimate at the mid-2026 SEC deck; the hedge book; the NOL structure; the Quality of Earnings chapter and the CEO profile — both ABSENT from the reference report, written now from the DEF 14A proxy filed 27.04.2026 (unavailable at the prior analysis) and from the 10-K/10-Q.
Sources: SEC EDGAR — 10-Q 30.06.2026 (acc. 0001628280-26-054413), 8-K/EX-99.1 Q2 2026 release (acc. 0001628280-26-053557), 10-Q 31.03.2026, 10-K FY2025 (acc. 0001628280-26-015318), 10-K FY2024/FY2023, DEF 14A 2026 (acc. 0001140361-26-017133), XBRL companyfacts/companyconcept; deterministic data pack deep_data_pack.py 04.09.2026; web research brief 04.09.2026 (checked point by point against filings — see the error note below); simulation mc_dcf.py (file mc-SD-20260904.json).
Research-brief verification note: the brief attributed to Freedom Broker the claim that "oil production fell 7.1% quarter over quarter." The filing contextualizes it: oil production was 328 MBbl in Q2 2026 vs 353 MBbl in Q1 2026 (681 − 328), i.e. … sequentially on oil volume, but … year over year, while total production grew … sequentially (1,797 vs 1,671 MBoe). Both statements are true; the brief didn't distinguish them. Oil's share of production fell from 21% to 18% — a gassier mix in a quarter with a collapsed gas price, which is actually the real problem and wasn't named by any analyst cited. The rest of the brief's figures check out against the filings.
Executive summary
The underlying thesis hasn't changed: SandRidge is a small Anadarko Basin oil/gas producer with zero interest-bearing debt, 114.7M USD of cash (30.06.2026, including 1.3M restricted), a tax shield of … federal NOL + … state + over 33.5M USD of federal tax credits (10-Q Q2 2026, Note 8) that keeps the effective tax rate at 0%, and proved reserves valued by the SEC at PV-10 = 439.6M USD at 31.12.2025. What's changed in the 38 days between reports is the direction of commodity prices, and it's the opposite of what was assumed in the prior pre-mortem.
The reference report built risk scenario #1 around a price collapse ("Brent already below 70 $/bbl, EIA forecasting 74 $/bbl for Q3 2026"). The Q2 2026 filing shows the opposite: NYMEX WTI averaged 95.65 $/bbl in Q2 2026, versus 72.74 $ in Q1 2026 and 64.57 $ in Q2 2025 (10-Q Q2 2026, Item 2). The realized oil price was 95.35 $/bbl. Revenue climbed to 51.1M USD (… YoY), net profit to 26.7M USD (0.72 $/share), adjusted EBITDA to 34.0M USD, and quarterly FCF to +23.2M USD after a negative Q1 (−1.1M). The falsifier built on price didn't just hold — it broke in the favorable direction.
The counter-move, absent from any headline: gas collapsed at the realization level, 1.36 $/Mcf in Q2 2026 versus 3.13 $ in Q1 and 1.82 $ YoY, with NYMEX Henry Hub at 3.06 $/Mcf — a Mid-Continent basis differential of …, the worst in the reported window. Gas is 50% of volume and only 14% of Q2 revenue. Net effect of the two moves: the realized price per Boe was 28.45 $ in Q2 vs 29.78 $ in Q1 — practically flat. The two commodities almost perfectly offset each other, a structural observation more important than either alone, and one the prior report couldn't make.
The valuation consequence that matters: the SEC prices used in the full-cost ceiling test rose from 65.34 $/bbl and 3.39 $/MMBtu (31.12.2025) to 71.90 $/bbl and 3.64 $/MMBtu (30.06.2026), with the company estimating 75.25 $ / 3.62 $ for the test at 30.09.2026 (10-Q, Item 2). The reported PV-10 of 439.6M USD is by construction anchored to the old deck. Re-decked at the 30.06.2026 prices using the method reconstructed below (which reproduces the reported figure within a 1.3% error), estimated PV-10 climbs to ~510M USD, and NAV/share from … $ to ~16.85 $. This is the only material value move in the refresh.
Estimated value: triangulated range 5.05–…/share, median (NAV/reported PV-10 anchor) …, EPV Greenwald …, re-decked NAV …. Monte Carlo over 20,000 scenarios with owner earnings …M USD: median intrinsic value …, median MOS ** …, undervaluation probability ** …, probability of MOS above … only ** …**.
Verdict: MONITOR, leaning positive versus 27.07.2026. What improved: the owner-earnings base (… → …M USD), the reserve deck, operational execution (four Cherokee wells completed in H1, two in July, the program's lowest drilled-well cost), and the disappearance of reporting uncertainty (Q2 came in strong). What did not improve and blocks a move to BUY: the margin of safety on the sturdiest anchor stays below 5%; zero buybacks in H1 2026 with the stock at 11–14 $ and 68.3M USD of unused authorization; the NOL-preservation plan (a 4.9% poison pill) was extended on 15.06.2026 to July 2029, reducing the near-term probability of an Icahn transaction; and — a new finding from the 10-K — the "declining" production cost from the prior thesis was largely an accounting artifact.
Figures were removed from this excerpt. The full report opens free for five tickers a week — see what's open now.
Full report contents
- Executive summary
- 🔒 Business and moat (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Management and capital allocation (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 What changed over the last 4 quarters (Q2 2025 → Q2 2026) (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Balance sheet analysis — Quality of Earnings (Thornton O'Glove method) (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 CEO profile — Outsider traits (William Thorndike method) (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Accounting red flags (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Triangulated valuation (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Pre-mortem (why the thesis could be wrong) (Available in the full report)
- 🔒 Verdict compared with the GBL score in the tracker (Available in the full report)
Evaluation history
| Date | Verdict |
|---|---|
| 2026-07-18 | Interesting |
| 2026-07-27 | Interesting |
| 2026-09-04 | Interesting |
| 2026-09-06 | Interesting |
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