EVER — EverQuote, Inc. Class A

EverQuote, Inc. (NASDAQ: EVER) — deep-value analysis

August 18, 2026 · reference price … · market cap …M · EV …M · single currency USD (reporting and trading)

Issuer-identity warning — read before any figure. The web research brief generated this morning for this ticker (research-EVER-20260818.md, 8,441 characters) describes Evergent Investments S.A. (formerly SIF Moldova), BVB, symbol EVER — NAV, discount to net asset value, dividend 0.135 lei, Anima Wings, Cătălin Iancu. It’s the wrong company. The tracker Pregatire_investitii_21.xlsx, row 212, says “Symbol EVER · Company EverQuote, Inc. Class A · Exchange NASDAQ,” and the “Bursa” column is the arbiter the procedure specifies. The EVER collision (EverQuote US / Evergent BVB) wasn’t in the known-collision list — I add it explicitly here. The brief was entirely discarded from the analysis; no figure from it appears below. All the data below comes from the SEC filings of CIK 1640428 (10-K FY2025 filed 02.24.2026, 10-Q Q1’26 filed 05.05.2026, 10-Q Q2’26 filed 08.04.2026 — I downloaded the last two myself, they were missing from the set), from the DEF 14A filed 04.23.2026, from the 2026 Form 4s, and from targeted market checks cited in place.

Executive summary (1 page: thesis, estimated value, verdict)

EverQuote operates an online property & casualty (P&C) insurance marketplace in the United States: it buys consumer traffic searching for policies, qualifies it, and sells it as “referrals” (clicks, data, calls) to insurers and agents. It doesn’t underwrite risk, doesn’t hold policies, has no inventory and no financial debt. The business economics boil down to a single equation: how much it pays for a visitor versus how much it collects on the resulting referral. The difference is called Variable Marketing Dollars (VMD) and is, essentially, gross profit. Over the trailing twelve months the company produced revenue of …lion (…M in 2025, …M in 2024, …M in 2023 — 10-K FY2025, Item 7), Adjusted EBITDA of …M, operating cash flow of …M and simple FCF (CFO − capex) of …M.

Thesis: the market is currently paying 6.4× TTM operating cash flow at the enterprise level (EV …M / CFO …M) for a debt-free asset with …M cash that’s growing revenue 20…/year and Adjusted EBITDA margin by about 200 basis points/year. The reason for the discount isn’t a mystery or a market error: (1) brutal cyclicality — between 2021 and 2023 revenue fell from …M to …M and Adjusted EBITDA from …M to …M, and CFO was negative two years running (−…M in 2022, −…M in 2023); (2) extreme customer concentration — two customers represented 38% and 11% of 2025’s revenue, and as of 06.30.2026 four customers held 66% of receivables; (3) apparent earnings quality is inflated by a one-off item — the Q4 2025 release of the …M deferred tax asset valuation allowance, which turns a reported P/E of 7.9× into a fictitious multiple.

The flow base I built the valuation on isn’t CFO − capex. I started from the data pack’s bridge (which, correctly, flags no interest-placement divergence — EverQuote is a US GAAP issuer with no debt, interest is income, not expense, and leasing is exclusively operating, so entirely within CFO) and added the two adjustments that actually matter here: stock compensation of …M/year, which is a real cost to the shareholder (the diluted average share count rose from 33.4M in 2023 to 37.8M in 2025 and fell to 36.2M in Q2 2026 only because the firm spent …M on buybacks), and tax normalization: over the TTM the company paid …M cash tax against approximately …M at a normalized 23% rate, the difference being the tax-loss-carryforward shield, which runs out in about two years. Result: normalized FCFE …M, i.e. a 7.3% yield on market cap and 8.6% on enterprise value.

Valuation, five triangulated models (details in the dedicated chapter): bear DCF on a low-cycle scenario … (MOS …), Greenwald EPV no growth … (…), 5-year historical multiples … (…), base DCF … (…), bull DCF … (…). Monte Carlo over 20,000 scenarios on the base assumptions gives a median intrinsic value of … and an undervaluation probability of …%, but with the 10th percentile at … — i.e. one in ten reasonable scenarios leaves the stock overvalued even so.

Verdict: MODERATE BUY, small position (1.5… of portfolio), with a limit price below … The value range is wide precisely because the flow base sits at a cyclical peak; it’s not a model error, it’s a real property of the business. At … I’m at about 78% of median value, with a margin of safety of about 22% — enough for a position, insufficient for a conviction position in a company where a single client is worth 31… of revenue and where the auto underwriting cycle can wipe out half the cash flow in eighteen months, as it has already done once in the last five years.