OGC — OceanaGold Corporation

OGC — OceanaGold Corporation · deep-value analysis (REDO / REFRESH regime)

Analysis date: September 13, 2026 · Reference price: US… (NYSE, close 09/11/2026) / … (TSX) · Market cap: US… · EV: US… Reference analysis: rapoarte/deep/2026-08-22-deep-OGC.md (verdict then: DO NOT BUY at …) · Delta package: rapoarte/deep/delta-OGC-20260912.md · Mechanical triage: REFRESH (1 unclassifiable 6-K filing, 2 unverifiable falsifiers) Reporting and trading currency: USD (no currency gap; NZD/PHP/AUD are cost exposures, not reporting ones) Primary sources: 40-F/40FR12B 03/27/2026 (2025 AIF + PwC Canada-audited IFRS statements + FY2025 MD&A), 6-K 05/07/2026 (Q1 2026), 6-K 08/06/2026 (Q2 2026), 6-K 08/17/2026 (Ausgold), 6-K 09/09/2026 (MP4 Macraes — NEW filing, downloaded this session), all CIK 0001487326.

What I inherit and what I re-derive. The REFRESH regime shortens the reading work, not the report’s structure. I inherit UNCHANGED, from the 08/22/2026 analysis, everything untouched by a new filing or a new market figure: the business description and FY2025 revenue structure, the per-mine cost table, reserves and resources at 12/31/2025, the entire management and capital allocation chapter (including the buyback history, 0.44% skin in the game and the Ausgold acquisition terms), the balance sheet line by line through 06/30/2026, the entire O’Glove earnings-quality analysis, the CEO profile and the accounting red flags list. The reason is simple and verifiable: no new financial statements have appeared — the last reported set remains Q2 2026 (6-K 08/06/2026), and Q3 2026 publishes November 4, 2026. The FCF bridge is likewise fully inherited (frozen in the delta package, reconfirmed below as an order of magnitude at the new market cap).

I re-derive exactly four things, because FACTS moved: (1) the effect of the new 09/09/2026 filing on the thesis’s oldest “clock” — the 2028 expiry of the Macraes consents; (2) the discount rate, since the US 10Y yield rose from … to 4.95%; (3) the five valuation models and Monte Carlo, at the new rate and the new gold price; (4) the two falsifiers that came out “unverifiable” at triage, replaced with metrics that actually compute. The stock price move (… versus the delta package’s benchmark) is NOT the reason for the redo and I build no thesis around it.

Executive summary

The thesis, in one sentence — unchanged in substance, reinforced in the figures. OceanaGold still looks cheap on every nominal multiple — P/E 8.01x, adjusted EV/EBITDA 4.36x, FCFE yield 10.2%, net cash …, zero bank debt — but the entire denominator of these multiples remains produced by a gold price of …/oz (the trailing-four-quarter realized average), i.e. 1.95 times the …/oz price at which the company declares its own reserves and 36% above the …/oz the same management used, in the audited impairment model from Q4 2025, for 2029 and beyond. You’re not buying a cheap company; you’re buying a gold contract with ~2.5x operating leverage, wrapped in a P/E of 8.

What changed in three weeks. Three facts, in order of value importance:

1. Gold fell four weeks straight: …/oz (08/22/2026, which was also the three-month high — 4,640.8) → …/oz (09/11/2026), …. This doesn’t touch my mid-cycle assumption of …/oz (which I keep), but it demolishes the triangulation’s bull-type model, which assumed perpetual spot: spot owner earnings fall from 690 mil. to 600 mil., and that model’s intrinsic value falls from … to … — i.e. below today’s price. In August, one of five models still gave a positive margin. Today, zero of five.
2. The US 10Y yield rose from 4.65% to 4.95% (FRED DGS10, 09/10/2026). My discount rate becomes … + beta 1.545 × risk premium ~4.5% = 11.90%, rounded down to …% for the net-cash position (the same rounding convention as August, when 11.45% became 11%). It’s a facts move, not an opinion one, and the only assumption I change.
3. OceanaGold filed the MP4 application for Macraes on September 9, 2026 (6-K of 09/09/2026), under New Zealand’s Fast-track Approvals Act 2024. It’s the period’s only good news, and it’s real: it resolves the oldest of the three “clocks” I flagged in August and that the delta package explicitly listed as “remains unverified.”

What did NOT change. No new financial statements. The FCF bridge remains the frozen one: TTM FCFE = … = CFO 1,280.8 − capex 543.0 − lease principal 27.6 − dividends to the 20% Philippine minority 28.0, a divergence of … versus the company’s published simple FCF. Interest paid (…/year, entirely leasing) is already in CFO at this IFRS issuer — this isn’t the AFYA reference case. The normalization also remains: of the …, roughly 110 mil. is tax deferral (current tax liabilities 47.9 → 111.6 → 169.7 mil. over 18 months), so sustainable FCFE at the TTM realized price ≈ …

Elasticity, which remains the real thesis. At 530 koz of annual sales and an after-tax flow-through of 65.2%, every …/oz moves owner earnings by …:

Estimated value. Five models retriangulated at r = …% and price …: NAV on reserves (13.6 years) … · mid-cycle FCFE DCF … · Greenwald EPV … · normalized EV/EBITDA multiples … · FCFE DCF at perpetual spot gold …. Range …–…, median …, i.e. a median margin of safety of …. Monte Carlo over 20,000 scenarios (OE 450, g1 3%, r …%, gt 0%, nd −535): median …, probability of undervaluation …%, probability of a margin above 30% 3.1%.

Verdict: DO NOT BUY at … — with greater conviction than in August, not less. The business hasn’t deteriorated; if anything, MP4 improved it. But the stock price has stayed essentially flat while the one variable that matters — the gold price — fell 5.6%, and the discount rate I use rose 50 basis points. The arithmetic result is that the triangulation’s optimistic ceiling has fallen below the price: there’s no model left, not even the one built on today’s spot extrapolated perpetually, that justifies … The level worth re-evaluating at, with a 30% margin on the mid-cycle DCF: below ~…; or, equivalently, if gold durably resettles above …/oz, in which case my mid-cycle thesis is simply wrong (see Pre-mortem, scenario 1).

New convergence with the tracker. Versus August, when the valuation divergence was head-on (… in the tracker versus … for me), the tracker was re-scored on 09/06/2026 from evidence and fully adopted my assumptions: rows 56–60 of the Analiza sheet now contain exactly OE 450 / g1 3% / r 11% / gt 0% / nd −535, and row 55 gives a Disc.DCF of … — my August median, to the decimal. The GBL score fell from 15.25/30 to 13.5/30 (40%, SPECULATIVE), with Lynch falling from 6.0 to 4.0 on exactly the arguments I made. The remaining divergences are small and detailed in the final chapter.