2145 — Shanghai Chicmax Cosmetic Co., Ltd. Class H

Deep-value: 2145.HK — Shanghai Chicmax Cosmetic Co., Ltd.

Deep-value analysis, 28 August 2026. Reference price: HKD … (28.08.2026 close, yfinance). Market cap: HKD 9,200 mn ≈ CNY 7,874 mn. Reporting currency CNY, trading currency HKD; rate … = 0.8558 CNY (yfinance HKDCNY=X, 28.08.2026). All financial figures are in CNY millions unless otherwise noted.

Primary sources: the H1 2026 interim results announcement (HKEXnews, 27.08.2026, 2026082701717.pdf), the 2025 Annual Report (HKEXnews, 16.04.2026, 2026041602138.pdf), the 2025 annual results announcement (26.03.2026), the profit warning (17.08.2026), the announcement of the 29% Shanghai Yiye acquisition (11.08.2026), F10 Eastmoney for semiannual series, yfinance for price/FX/peer multiples. The company is not SEC-registered — EDGAR was intentionally skipped; the bare symbol “2145” resolves on Yahoo to the wrong company (“Datalinks Corp”), which is why the alias 2145 → 2145.HK was added to deep_data_pack.py and the data pack regenerated.

Executive summary

The thesis, briefly. Chicmax is a Chinese multi-brand cosmetics company that, between 2022 and 2025, grew revenue 3.4x (2,675 → 9,178 mn CNY) on the back of a single brand — KANS — and a single channel — Douyin. In H1 2026 the engine stopped: KANS fell 20.4% (3,344.0 → 2,661.4 mn), group revenue fell 8.6% (4,108.0 → 3,756.5 mn), and attributable profit collapsed 79.4% (524.2 → 108.2 mn). The stock lost ~77% from its 52-week high of HKD 102.3 (intraday) and trades today at HKD ….

What actually broke. Not the gross margin — that actually rose, from 75.5% to 76.7%. Operating leverage broke. Marketing and promotion expense was practically flat (2,084.7 vs. 2,069.1 mn, …), but staff cost exploded 41.6% (353.0 → 499.9 mn), R&D 36.4% (103.1 → 140.6 mn), and PP&E depreciation 142.7% (44.2 → 107.3 mn), as new factories and the new headquarters came online. With falling revenue and a fixed-cost base up ~200 mn CNY per half-year, the operating margin fell from 16.2% to 4.4%. The return on marketing spend (revenue/marketing) fell from 1.99x to 1.80x: the company spends nearly the same and sells less.

What didn’t break. The balance sheet is clean and, in many ways, better than a year ago. Receivables fell 32.6% since 31.12.2025 (365.8 → 246.7 mn) on revenue down only 8.6% — a DSO of 14.8 days, among the lowest in the industry, because the model is “prepayment, except for a few large customers” (2025 Annual Report, note 22). Inventory fell …% y/y, and finished goods had already fallen 4.1% in 2025 on revenue …. Financial debt is 361.0 mn at interest rates of 0.85%…, and cash plus liquid investments (686.0 + 5.0 + 146.9 = 837.9 mn) exceed bank debt by 476.9 mn. H1 2026 operating cash flow was 312.5 mn — 2.5x accounting profit.

Estimated value. I triangulated five models on an owner-earnings base of 500 mn CNY (normalized FCFE to the parent company’s shareholders — see the valuation chapter for the full bridge). The margin-of-safety range spans from … (bear: flows 380 mn, zero growth, r 12%) to … (bull: 650 mn, 8% growth, r 10%), with the five-model median at …. A Monte Carlo simulation over 20,000 scenarios gives a median intrinsic value of HKD … (median MOS …) and a probability of undervaluation of only …%.

Verdict: WATCH, DON’T BUY YET. The price has fallen 77%, but value has fallen too. At 11.5x TTM profit and 0.88x sales (enterprise value), the stock is no longer expensive — but it also doesn’t offer the margin of safety a case demands where 70.8% of revenue comes from a brand in 20% decline and 94.1% of sales from a single channel type. What would change the verdict, in order of probability: (1) proof in the H2 2026 results (March 2027) that KANS has stabilized — management claims a gradual recovery since July 2026, but the claim isn’t yet verifiable; (2) a price below ~HKD 17, where even the DCF’s bear scenario becomes tolerable; (3) an aggressive H-share buyback — the mandate has been approved since 8 May 2026 and hasn’t been used for a single day.

The analysis’s biggest surprise: the company valued its own growth subsidiary (Shanghai Yiye / newpage) at 1.82x sales via an independent appraiser in August 2026, while the market values the entire parent group at 0.88x sales. Chicmax is buying at double the multiple it itself trades at — and yet isn’t buying its own stock.